On 26th April, Kosovo Prime Minister Agim Ceku revived the border dispute between Kosovo and Macedonia. Once its status determined, Kosovo demands to renegotiate the border demarcation, which was agreed by Yugoslavia and Macedonia in 2001. As to Macedonia, it sets the closure of the border dispute as a pre-condition for Kosovo’s independence. As everyone wait for the result of Ceku’s visit to Skopje on 5th May, here is a quick review on one of the most sensitive axis of the Balkans: Macedonia-Kosovo-Albania…
Macedonian policy towards Kosovo
After Croatia, Macedonia is the one, which is the closest to the European club. Since the end of the civil war in 2001, Skopje has been doing its best to prove that Macedonia is now politically a stable country. Given its dangerous geography, Macedonia’s current political situation is a remarkable success. Macedonia, which was granted the candidate status on 17th December last year, became the second former Yugoslavian Republic, after Croatia, to get a green light from Brussels.
Macedonia’s secret is its incredibly cautious and sensitive policy towards the Albanians of the Balkans. As far as Kosovo’s final status is concerned, Skopje has been following the safest policy possible: to keep in tune with Western mainstream. As to its relations with Albania, its main advantage is the fact that Albania, too, has Euro-Atlantic dreams and like Macedonia has to act very carefully.
Until late 2004, Macedonia, though largely neutral over Kosovo’s status in declarations, discreetly supported the option of Kosovo as a part of Serbia. As the Western position became clearer last winter Skopje has changed its policy and does not exclude the possibility of an independent Kosovo - full or conditional. The reason why is that Skopje saw that any solution is better that insolubility. A Kosovo as an independent entity under the political and economic guidance of the Euro-Atlantic bloc is less dangerous than a Kosovo as a kind of no-man’s-land where a frustrated people is ready to explode in great fury at any time. Skopje is well aware of the practical and political benefits of Kosovo's independence: a secure, friendly neighbour, a calm internal minority and an economic partner.
Macedonia’s main concern is the level of stability and security in its immediate north neighbourhood, which will affect the speed of its integration into the Euro-Atlantic bloc. The quicker Kosovo’s status is clarified, the better for Macedonia. All the more as that Macedonia knows by experience what an unpredictable neighbourhood means: the six-month civil war in 2001 was triggered off by the frustrated ex-UCK (Kosovo Liberation Army) militants in the Albanian-populated western part of the country.
The year of the Macedonian civil war was not a coincidence. The open unrest began partly because of the delineation of the common Yugoslavia-Macedonia border. Under the 2001 agreement, Serbia transferred 2500 hectares to Macedonia and thus deprived Kosovo from 1200 hectares of farmland (through Debelde area). The agreement, which was signed on 22nd February, was welcomed by every factor in the international community (Macedonia’s neighbours, the EU, USA, NATO, etc.). The Kosovo Albanians, who were just delivered from the Serbian oppression and promised a new and brighter future, were highly dissatisfied to see Serbia having the authority to decide on their behalf. That the terrorist activities of the Liberation Army of Presevo-Medvedja-Bujanovac (UCPMB) in southern Serbia and the National Liberation Army of Macedonia (UCKM) in north-western Macedonia started during those years was not a simple coincidence.
The border demarcation agreement is perfectly legal, and the international community supports it all the same. Yet the issue, though a technical one, is still contentious.
| |
|
| |
 |
| |
Village of Debelde in Kosovo |
Since 2001 political balances have changed significantly on the Kosovo side of the demarcation line. Serbia, though legally still the master of Kosovo, transferred de facto its sovereignty rights to the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). Now Pristina wants to amend what was considered by many Albanians as Serbia’s “last harmful act” to Kosovo. As the head of border village of Debelde, Hamoi Hasani put it: “The Serbs instructed the Macedonians to take our land”.
On 26th April, Kosovo Prime Minister Agim Ceku, speaking in Debelde, stated: “Serbia does not have any right to sign anything related to Kosovo because they have no authority over Kosovo”. From a purely judicial point of view, Ceku’s claim seems highly unfounded; yet the political reality is more complicated. Ceku pursued his speech as follows: “Macedonia must start realising they have a new neighbour. Kosovo is Macedonia's new neighbour”. Again judicially not yet. And Ceku and other Kosovo officials must be aware of this fact since they insist that the possible renegotiation of the border demarcation must start after the clarification of Kosovo’s final status. Pristina wants to negotiate with Skopje as equal.
Macedonian Foreign Minister Ilinka Mitreva stressed her country’s official line: “The border demarcation as a technical issue should be completed before Kosovo's final status has been defined”. Obviously Skopje finds easier to negotiate with the UNMIK than with Pristina. Macedonian President Branko Crvenkovski stated that Macedonia has "no intention of renegotiating”. Since it is known that the international community backs the 2001 border agreement as it is, the Macedonian stance becomes comprehensible. To discuss the issue during the final status talks sponsored by UN would not be a renegotiation, but a confirmation. On 16th April, US special envoy to Kosovo Frank Wisner, during his visit to Skopje, clearly stated that there is a valid international agreement in place, and that the demarcation issue should be resolved before a final decision is reached on Kosovo's final status. It seems that Skopje has a great ally in this matter.
On 27th April, Ceku played down the border dispute, stating that the line agreed by Macedonia and Serbia in 2001 would be respected in practice: “This, for us, is a very technical issue, not a political issue and not a source of political destabilisation”. This “very technical issue” will be discussed during Ceku’s official visit to Macedonia this Friday. Skopje hopes to persuade Ceku to accept the 2001 agreement.
However Macedonia must be very careful in its relations with Kosovo, for the sake of its own security inside. The Albanian minority in Macedonia forms 19.2 percent of the population (est. 2004). The relations between Albanians in Macedonia and Kosovo have traditionally been closer even than with the Albanians in Albania, because those Albanians lived under the common roof of Yugoslavia for 46 years. Most Albanians in Macedonia consider these two Albanian communities as a whole: “Albanians in Macedonia may feel an ethnic tie to Albania, but the big emotional tie is to Kosovo. Kosovo is the cultural and intellectual foundation for us. The writers, the journalists, the educators all came from Kosovo; anything of value is from there. We need to defend Kosovo”. Macedonia will not fail then to count with the Pristina-educated Albanian minority on its own soil. And after all the Macedonians, too, were oppressed by Slobodan Milosevic: they can easily sympathise with the Kosovo Albanians' aspirations and fears.
Macedonia and Albania
| |
|
 |
|
| Former Albanian PM Fatos Nano (R) and his Macedonian counterpart Vlado Buckovski review an honour guard in Tirana, 12 January 2005 |
|
In a way Macedonia’s stability and security depend on its relations with the Albanians of the Balkans. In this regard, the Macedonia-Albania relations are extremely important - both for Macedonia and Albania.
Until 1997, Albania conditioned its relations with Macedonia on the advancement of the status of the Albanian minority. After the general chaos following the collapse of several pyramid schemes in spring 1997, Tirana determined that the minority rights of Albanians should be satisfied according to European standards and within the Macedonian institutions. That is why Albania condemned the terrorist activities of the UCKM from the beginning. The EU Zagreb Summit in November 2000 opened a new European perspective for Albania. Ever since Tirana’s foreign policy has never gone astray from moderation.
Although according to official census of 1989 there are only 5000 Macedonians in Albania, Macedonian sources have claimed that there are 120.000-350.000. Neutral estimates vary from 10.000 to 30.000. Their greatest concentration is in the bordering regions of Golo Brdo (eastern Albania, near Debar in Macedonia) and Mala Prespa (around Lake of Prespa). Although Albania recognises the Macedonians as national minority (unlike Greece and Bulgaria), it restricts this status to the region of Mala Prespa. Several Macedonian associations -Mir (Peace), Bratstvo (Brotherhood), Prespa, MED (Macedonian Aegean Society)- struggle in order to improve political, cultural, linguistic and educational rights of the Macedonian minority. As late as June 2005, the Macedonians of Albania could found a political party of their own: Macedonian Alliance for European Integration. Although there is a long way to go for Albania to improve the status of its Macedonian citizens, Macedonia proper has never insisted on reciprocity. On the one hand, the weight of the Macedonian minority in Albania (slightly more than 0.5 percent) and that of the Albanian minority in Macedonia (19.2 percent) is not the comparable at all. On the other hand, the two countries have much to gain in supporting each other in their common way to Europe.
| |
|
| |
 |
| |
Frank Wisner |
The level of stability and security in its immediate neighbourhood is also crucially important for Albania. Macedonia and Albania have excellent bilateral relations.
One can conclude that the EU is charged with an extreme responsibility in the Balkans. If today there is peace in this region, it is because these countries long for EU membership and they know that they can have it only through political and economic stability. What would harm their European commitment most would be that if Europe treats the region like a backyard. If one thinks about the popular feeling in some central European countries as “second-class citizens”, it would be extremely disappointing for the Balkan people to feel themselves as “third-class citizens”. Balkan countries make great efforts for Europe. Europe should do it as well, and prove that it is more than a European elite club.
The somewhat passive policy of Macedonia (and Albania) towards Kosovo is comprehensible. Kosovo is the chessboard of great powers and a minor player like Macedonia could change nothing in this process. During his visit, American special envoy Frank Wisner diplomatically reminded Skopje of the US support and stated that it is important that the Macedonian government understands how the USA views the progress of the talks on Kosovo's status and their conclusion. Thus Macedonia will probably keep following its cooperative policy throughout these crucial times. “Hold back the edges of your gowns, Ladies, we are going through hell”, as the poet said.
Related items:
Albania: A Mere Supporter of Kosovo Team in the Grandstand (29.04.06)
The Macedonia-Bulgaria Dispute or Endless Torment of Clio (16.03.06)
Two Major Muslim Minorities of Macedonia: Albanians and Turks (08.03.06)
The Macedonia-Greece Name Dispute: Only the Tip of the Iceberg (28.02.06)
A Long Voyage: Macedonia Sets Sail for Europe (05.02.06)
Kosovo: A New State or a New Bone of Contention in the Balkans? (26.11.05)
Kosovo is Heating Up Again (16.11.2005)
Political Solution and Terrorism in Macedonia (11.10.05)
Main Page | News Page | 007 News | Print
|
